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The aim of relation is relation's own being, that is,
contact with the Thou. For through contact with every
thou we are stirred with a breath of the Thou, that is,
of eternal life. 1

- Martin Buber
To enter into relation with another individual, to estab
lish an existence-communication" where fundamental ethical
demands are experienced directly - the twentieth-century
Jewish theologian Martin Buber saw the reality of this relation
to the Thou as mediating access to /I eternal life." And the aim',
the authentic telos of this relationship with the other, Buber
urged, rests simply in establishing relationship itself, in achiev
ing genuine contact' with another independent, existing per
son.
, The emphasis in Bubel" s existentialist thought on the
ethical primacy of an I-Thou relation is anticipated, as is well
acknowledged, by seminal insights from within the large,
literary corpus of S0ren Kierkegaard. For the Danish Lutheran
Kierkegaard, the basic concern of this ethical relation with the
Thou finds its most paradigmatic expression in the existing
human's relationship to the absolute 'Other.' Itisarelationship
which is grounded in - language suggestively evoked in
Buber's later formulations - in the infinite interest in one's
"eternal happiness." And this "relation of the subject [to God]
is precisely the knotty subject," a concenl of central importance
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within Kierkegaard's philosophy,2
What is at stake here? Why does this subjective relation
ship of the existing individual to her eternal happiness, this
"God-relationship," constitute, for Kierkegaard, the knotty
subject? Understood properly, it is just this dilemma which
confronts each person as an existing individual. It was this
overarching concern which bore a foundational bearing for his
entire thinking, and indeed, for his own life:
. , , what good would it do me to be able to explain the
meaning of Christianity if it had no deeper signifi
cance forme and for my life; - what good would it dp
me if truth stood before me, cold and naked, not
caring whether I recognized her or not, and produc
ing in me a shudder of fear rather than a trusting
devotion? I certainly do not deny that I still recognise
an imperative of understanding and that through it
one can work upon men, but it must be taken up into
my life, and that is what I now recognise as the most
important thing. 3

The 'imperative' llr.trure derives from its intellectual, and
lnore decisively, from its existential claims upon the person's
life, as she lives it; its difficulty rests in the manner in which we
rela te to the truth.
Before tackling the 'knotty subject' of the believer's
existential stance, we need to underscore a basic condition for
any truth-relationship at alL It is the concern that opens the
pseudonym Johannps Climacus' first work, Philosophical Frag
ments - namely, "Can the truth be learned?" Can we even
acquire Kierkegaard's "imperative of understanding" at all,
not only to 'work upon' others, but to take up truth in our own
individual lives? Instead of engaging in a predominant ap
proach in formulating this issue - by concentrating on
Kierkegaard's celebrated thesis that "truth is subjectivity," that'
knowledge of truth is obtained via some existential, subjective
mode of inquiry - we want to retrieve here what seems an
almost entirely neglected element in most expositions on his
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philosophy: a full description of Kierkegaard' s essentially nega
tive response to the question.
Thatis, we want to outline those conditions and features
inherent in the humanpredicamentthat atleastfor Kierkegaard,
present themselves as barriers, or perhaps better, as inevitable
limitations or horizons to human attempts at knowing. And in
this respect, we want to secure for Kierkegaard an anticipatory
status not only as a proto-deconstructionist, as scholars as
diverse as Louis Mackey, Mark Taylor and others have vari
ously suggested, but also, and perhaps more calmly, as an
important proto-hermeneutical thinker - as anticipating stances
maturely formulated in later Continental philosophers such as
Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and others. We
want to establish what Kierkegaard sees as the situated contin
gency and 'fallibilistic' status intrinsic in any human knowl
edge.
Drawing particularly from the hallmark writings of the
pseudonymous Johannes Climacus, we will try to piece to
gether an organized view of how Kierkegaard would urge us to
understand that most elevated project of human knowledge
that is, metaphysical speculation, this theoretical explanation
into the way things are. 4 It was the urgent need for delimiting
this tendency in "the present age" towards totalizing system
building which provoked Kierkegaard into enlisting the talents
of a dialectician like Johannes Climacus. The well-known his
torical outcome of this maneuver was an elaborate, existential
defense of a thoroughly more tempered view of human know
ing, working towards a hermeneutical 'reconstruction' of hu
man finitude, and of the radical contingency of human knowl
edge and historical existence itself.

A Pseudonymous Perspective on the Metaphysical Project
Employing for his own particular purposes an insight
derived from Lessing, JohalUles Climacus endorses the thesis
that a system of existence cannot be given. 115 For Climacus, so
/I
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called systems of existence, necessarily arising from an essen
tially detached vie"wpoint, are fundamentally contrary to the
nature of human existence itself. Kierkegaard's distinctive
formulations about "metaphysics" are fueled by exactly anti
Hegelian concerns of this sort, by whatJohannes Climacus and
other pseudonyms considered as fundamental shortcomings
in any metaphysical project.
What best characterizes metaphysics, and the way in
'which speculative thought conceives of existence? It is pre
eminently a desire to understand one's existence sub specie
aeterni,6 the attempt to conjoin in human systems thought and
existence, ideality and actuality. This attitude fosters a "meta
physical withdrawal,"7 which always remains an existential
impossibility because it requires an abstraction out of exist
ence itself. As Climacus puts it, "The systematic idea is subject
object, is the unity of thinking and being; existence, on the
other hand, is precisely the separation." s To locate Kierkegaard's
insight in more familiar, philosophical environs, metaphysical
systematization is preeminently that sort of thinking which
Hilary Putnam would indict as being a wistful, realist longing
for a God's-eye perspective, an 'externalistic' all-encompass
ingviewpoint from which to definitively understand the whole
of reality.9
Johannes Climacus sets a fundamental opposition in
motion here. On the one hand, we can embrace the deliver
ances of a theoretical metaphysics; on the other, we are con
fronted with existence itself, with the actuality of living one's
own life. This same dilemma faced another Kierkegaard
pseudonym, Constantin Constatius, in Repetition. 10 There, the
issue was whether movement in the "existential" sense was
possible, and Constantius set the stage with a classical dispute
between the Eleatics, who theoretically denied motion, and
Diogenes, who came forward to refute them. "He literally did
come forward, because he did not say a word but merely paced
pack and forth a few times, thereby assuming that he had
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sufficiently refuted them."ll
Metaphysical speculation, like the Eleatic denial of real
motion, is always on the side of theoretically 'freezing' actual
ity, of trying to rarefy the constant flux of human existence into
permanent, immobilized systems. Instead of movement for
ward, instead of genuine existential repetition, speculative
thought feigns motion through a recollection (in a Socratic
fashion) of systematic knowledge which one has, in fact, al
ways imamnently possessed.
Johannes Climacus affirms a related doctrine. Rather
than stress on 'repetition' for acquiring existential knowledge,
the arguments in the Postscript instead emphasize the ethical
category. It is in the ethical- which, on at least one possible
characterization, is where an individual moves beyond pure
immediacy, and the multiplicities of options given by reflec
tion, to that place where one relates in a committed sense of
subjectivity - in which we encounter the difficulty of actual
existence. Climacus writes:
The continued striving is the expression of the exist
ing subject's ethical life view. The continued striving
must therefore not be understood metaphysically,
but neither is there any individual who exists meta
physically.J2

This "continued striving," which, in apostolic Pauline
language, is familiarly expressed as a pressing on to that goal
ahead,I3 is eminently the language of achIality, of existential
movement. And this necessity, Climacus would urge, demon
strates the incompatibility of living in effortless, speculative
categories. To reemphasize his insight, "neither is there any
individual who exists metaphysically." 14
The project which underlies the project in the Postscript"
is thus more fundamental in a religious sense. The task is
ethical and religious existence itself. The goal, the absolute
telos, resides in one's acquiring of her own infinite, eternal
happiness.
To yield to the ethical sphere, through resolving to
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commit oneself, is to enter into actual existence. Metaphysics,
on the other hand, would have us to go even beyond existence,
as the term itself could literally be taken to imply, the 'meta-II
or moving past or beyond, of natural existence itself; to move
beyond the difficulty which constitutes the task of life. IS This
recalls Kierkegaard' s repeated illustration of the system-builder
who makes for herself a grand castle, and then occupies the hut
next door, or the comical figure of Johannes Climacus' Herr
Professor, who, in explaining all of existence, "has in sheer
absentmindedness forgotten what he himself is called, namely
that he is a human being... and not a fantastical three-eighths of
a paragraph."16
Kierkegaard's critique of metaphysics, then, is an in
dictment from an ethical standpoint. It charges the metaphy
sician with'skipping,' or 'leaping over,' the ethical sphere -
and with that, existence itself. Either an individual refuses to
enter into existence, never allowing an aut/aut to even arise in
one's life. Or one has skipped it, attempting to systematize
existence when the real task before one is constituted by life
itself. And a final spatial metaphor, which seems, at least on
this account, to exhaust metaphysics' possible neglect of exist
ence, is that the person stands outside of existence altog~~thcr.
There are two ways in which an existing person can
be outside of existence, but in neither of these ways
does he mediate. One way is abstracting himself, by
going a skeptical impassivity, an abstract indiffer
ence... The other way in which the individual can be
outside existence is by being in a state of passion, but
it is the veIY moment of passion that he gains the
momenhlm to existP

We deliberately set aside this latter way of how one 'pas
sionately' proceeds in existence; for present purposes, we want
to evaluate the radical limitations inherent in the metaphysical
project, as outlined by Climacus.
First, the metaphysical viewpoint, by which a person

RECONSTRUCTION OF HUMAN FINITUDE

7

wants to eternally understand the whole of existence, is a
position sub specie aeterni, where"the truth would be something
concluded for him."18 liBut where is this point?1J Climacus
presses. "The I-I is a mathematical point that does not exist at
all ... "19 It is, quite literally, what Thomas Nagel has aptly
called, a "view from nowhere."2o
And second, the role that speculation plays in actual
human existence must be sharply demarcated. This delimiting
of 'objective' knowledge will be taken up again in the next
section. Here we can note how, at least for Climacus, knowl
edge, by itself, is woefully inadequate. Climacus insists that
the ethical is not only a knowing; it is also a doing that is related
to a knowing ... "21 In fact, this ethical dimension can be seen
as a necessary pre-condition for having any knowledge at all.
As Climacus suggests, liTo exist subjectively with passion is on
the whole an absolute condition for being able to have any
opinion about Christianity." 22 The presence of subjectivity, of
a passionate interestedness, alters our very epistemological
capacity to acquire relevant knowledge. 23
Third, and finally, this theoretical knowledge, divorced
from the ethical, cannot even be considered to be the highest
goal for which we should strive: 24'
II

By acting, by venturing the decisive thing (which
every human being is capable of doing) in utmost
subjective passion and in full consciousness of an
eternal responsibility, one comes to know something
else, also that to be a human being is something other
than year in and year out pinning something together
in a system. 25

Knowledge, apart from abstract knowledge, knowledge
that focuses onthe individual's own existence, is whatJohannes
Climacus calls the 'essential truth' for human beings. 26
This last section examines ways in which these limits to
human knowledge are made concrete - not through the'supe
riority' of an ethical actuality (the more 'positive' approach for
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Kierkegaard), but through the inadequacies inherent in the sort
of knowledge itself.

The Undermining of Metaphysics and Human Existence
A system of existence cannot be given. Is there, then,
not such a system? That is not the case. Neitheris this
implied in what has been said. Existence itself is a
system for God, but it cannot be a system for any
existing spirit. System and conclusiveness correspond
to each other, but existence is the very opposite ...
Existing is the spacing that holds apart; the systematic
is the conclusiveness that combines,27

Johannes Climacus' metaphor of 'spacing,' that concept
which intrinsically "holds apartf/ an otherwise 'conclusive'
portrait of existence, admits to a decisive gap in any attempt to
understand human existence. A stronger, more explicitly skep
tical belief bolsters the lack of systematic conclusiveness in this
picture of human existence. In the fashion of an unrelenting
Pyrrhonism, Johannes Climacus in the Postscript presses the
more unsettling contention that "the perpetual process of be
COIning is the uncertainty of human life, in which everything is
uncertain. Every human being knows this and says so once in a
while .. ," 28 All of our attempts at conclusive, speculative
systems of knowing are fundamentally undermined by the
nature of human existence itself.
What are these spaces" epistemological, metaphysi
cal; ethico-religious, and otherwise - which deny actually
existing persons a complete system of existence? How does
metaphysical speculation fail to provide a secure base of refer
ence, an epistemically privileged ground whereby one can
withstand the radical contingencies of human existence itself?
We want to single out one aspect in Climacus' account that
underscores the' negative' features in the human epistemologi
cal situation: the inescapable character of approximation
knowledge."
/I
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In achieving this task, Climacus' project develops in a
perhaps unexpected way. The conclusion to this polemical
appraisal of so-called' objective' knowledge, far from yielding
to an epistemic nihilism, or inducing some sort of Pyrrhonic
ataraxia, provides, rather, measures for overcoming skepti
cism. It enables the individual, in some deeply existential
sense, to engage, and appropriately come to grips with, that
most paradigmatic philosophically 'modern' aspiration: de
omnibus dubitandum est [everything must be doubtedJ.29
To inquire broadly, what role can historical or theoreti
cal 'objective' demonstration play in the believer's life? What
constitutes the proper relation between faith and objective
certitude? And can one ever reach a point of final stopping
place, where religious certainty is decisively granted? These
types of questions arise inevitably for Johannes Climacus'
philosophy whenever anyone tackles the'objective question'
of Christianity, thatis, when one inquires into the historical and
philosophicaltruthwithintheChristianfaith. Wewanttokeep
in mind two broader concerns. First, what exactly do these
"objective" trnths establish, if anything, for an individual
believer? And second, how should we understand the particu
lar relationship between objective certitude and faith?
Johannes Climacus' response to these concenlS is dou
bly negative. That is to say, Climacus repeatedly affirms -in a
theme which strongly anticipates what in contemporary philo
sophical circles has been termed a fallibilist' epistemological
position-human finitude rooted in historicity, a fundamental
contingency inherent in all potential grounds for 'objective'
human knowledge. 30 What faith demands is certitude, but of a
categorically different type than what "approximation cer
tainty of probabilities" can provide. It is an assurance which
presupposes an infinite interest as its conditio sine qua non, and
which can only be satisfied by some proportionate means. As
Climacns states it, only an insecure, embarrassed species of
faith would seek out the approximation-knowledge of objec
tive demollstration. 31 These objective truths provide only all
I
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approximation-knowledge," aless-than-certain account where
every future critical deliberation leaves the believer in suspenso,
forever, while remaining in reflective speculation, deferring
existential decision. It is a speculative skepticism which para
lyzes. In Climacus' words, "objectively understood, there are
more than enough results anywhere, but no decisive result
anywhere. "32
A further claim is made that even if the objective truths
of Christian faith were established as the most secure of all
human enterprises of knowledge, for a believer, nothing is
gained, not even in the least, "with regard to the power and
strength of his faith."33 On the contrary,
U

... in this prolix knowledge, in this certainty thatlurks
at faith's door and craves for it, he is rather in such a
precarious position that much effort, much fear and
trembling will be needed lest he fall into temptation
and confuse faith with knowledge. 34

For Climacus, radically, only in an epistem.ologically im
perfect world is faith even conceivable (!).
That is to say, a fundamental deficiency m.arks ~U1y
positive knowledge. As Climacus says, all of this positive fails
to express the state of the knowing subject in existence."s'.;
Speculative, theoretical results are diSingenuous claims of
inhumanly grasping the whole of reality sub specie aeterni.
/I

The Recovery of Finite Human Understanding
We can legitimately question whether Johannes
Climacus' appraisal of all sensate, historical, and speculative
truths is unwarrantedly dismissive, whetherhehastooguickly
disregarded the substantive contribution which objective truth
provides. 36 What concerns us here, however, is instead what
place these claim.s occupy in Climacus' broader philosophy.
While objective reasoning, in matters of objective truth, might
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yield certain appropriate methods, this approach fails on an
existential leveL It cannot provide the certainty required for
concern in one's summum bonum. "Faith does not result from
straightforward scholarly deliberation .. ." - only the infinite
inwardness of faith is dialectically adequate" to secure a real
foothold in true religiousIless.37
No religious result can ever be reached, if one remains
in presuppositionless speculation. As Kierkegaard noted in his
journals, reflection stays only I'the possibility of reflection."38
But once one has-Climacus would here say through a 'leap'
inwardly integrated objective results, then doubt inevitably
arises. 39
Here we can maintain perhaps one of the most sugges
tive rapprochements between Kierkegaard and later
hermeneutical thought: an adherence to the so-called
hermeneutical circle. In Climacus' account, and unlike what he
sees Hegel as doing, to acquire knowledge is to take a commit
ted stance, to be involved, and even personally contribute, to
that which one desires to know. For a later hermeneutic thinker,
like Martin Heidegger, and unlike aspects in Hllsserlian phe
nomenology, when a person attempts to understand anything,
she likewise cannot remail1.'presuppositionless', or acquire all
her beliefs in a state of pure detachment. "In interpreting,"
Heidegger explains familiarly, "we do not, so to speak, throw
a 'signification' over some naked thing which is present at
hand... In every case this interpretation is grounded in some
thing we have in advance."40 This proceeding from a pre-pos
sessed personal'fore-understanding' might seem circular, even
viciously so. But for Heidegger, "what is decisive is not to get
out of the circle but to come into it in the right way." 41
In the same manner, Kierkegaard would urge us to see
that the Hegelian system, in claiming to begin
presuppositionlessly, cannot begin at all: A logical system
must not poast of an absolute beginning, because such a begin
ning is just like pure being, a pure chimera. 1f42 We must start to
understand somewhere, and this is through what Climacus
1/
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calls a personal 'letting go', that is, a 'corning into' the circle of
human understanding. In other words, to understand, we
must involve ourselves, must already be implicated in that
which we desire to know, thus resolving the old Platonic
paradox in the Meno, of how we can learn anything new at alL
All understanding undoubtedly depends upon some human
interpretive framework in which we already operate and live.
As Alasdair MacIntyre adeptly observes, a world of textures,
shapes, smells, sensations, sound and nothing more invites no
questions and gives no grounds for furnishing any answers.//43
And this situatedness of our knowledge can grant us
only provisional legitimacy for any of our beliefs, making us
live, in a description that Climacus would undoubtedly en
dorse, "without the idea of the 'infinite intellect', finality, and
absolute knowledge ... [where we are called back] to an under
standing of what it means to be finite historical beings who are
always'on the" yay' and who must assume personal responsibil
ity for our decisions and choices."44 Committed existence is a
constant proceFs of historical becoming, from which dialecti
cal, and decidedly fallibilistic constant human striving, cannot
be excluded.
As neo-pragmatist Richard Rorty, himself sensitive to
hermeneutical insights,45 would say, what Kierkegaard has
been calling'approximation-knowledge' is what we as hu
mans are necessarily left with when we abandon our hope for
"metaphysical comfort"- when we displace what Rorty him
self refers to (in quasi-Kierkegaardian fashion) as "the desire
for objectivity. 1146 It results in the situation that "there is always
room for improved belief, 47 that, to use explicit Kiekegaardian
language, speCUlative results are always approximations, and
thus unable to bear the weight of one's infinite concern.
The antithesis to this line of thought is contained in a
classic statement in modern philosophy, by Rene Descartes.
Descartes, after subjecting all of his prior beliefs to an unrelent
ing doubt, proceeded to seek out some indubitable truth, to
arrive at some fact which was finally secure, entirely immune
II
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from further dialectical doubt. He compared his aspiration to
the Greek thinker
Archimides, [who] in order that he might draw the
terrestial globe out of its place, and transport it else
where, demanded only that one point should be fixed
and immovable; in the same way I shall have the right
to conceive high hopes if I am happy enough to
discover one thing only which is certain and indubi
table. 48
As if addressing Cartesian foundationalism directly,
Johannes Climacus speaks to this particular speculative ten
dency that Rorty (as we have already noted) has called our
desire for "metaphysical comfort." Climacus' response, an
essentially negative one, is that no such immobilized fulcrum,
no privileged place by which we can transport the 'terrestial
globe' out of its place, in fact exists:
In a human being there is always a desire, at once
comfortable and concerned, to have something really
firm and fixed tha t can exclude the dialectica I, but this
is cowardliness towards the divine ... even the most
fixed of all, an infinite negative resolution, which is
the indi yid ua lily's infinite form of God's being within
him, becomes promptly dialecticaL As soon as I take
away the dialectical, I am superstitious and defraud
God of the moment's strenuous acquisition of what
was once acquired. 49
For the religious relationship, 11 certainty is impossible for a
person in a process of becoming, and it is indeed a deception. II so
And this is what Johamles Climacus has called "the eternal
protest against fic Hons" - that we must face up to our historic
ity, our constant state of ethical striving.5J
As one 'postmodernist' philosopher has said, radically
underscoring this hermeneutical recognition of human fini
tude, the (proto-) deconstructionist and (proto-) hermeneutical
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insights by renegade thinkers like Kierkegaard must always:
blow the whistle on the excessively apodictic frame of
mind endemic to metaphysics and urge in its place a
sense of raising truth from below, of forging certain
contigent unities of meaning which may become
unstuck at any moment, or which may take on an
unexpected sense at a later date which will lead us to
revise them radically.52

From a human stand point, no fixed' center' of know ledge
exists. We are always denied what deconstructionists have
called a 'metaphysics of presence', a fullness or totality of
meaning. In other words, "the subjective existing thinker is
always just as negative as he is positive, and vice versa/'5S
claims an anticipatory Johannes Climacus.
It is only the superstitious' believer, who, in presumed
'positivity', fancies himself to have a certainty that can be had
only in infinitude, inwhich, however, he cannot be as an existing
person but at which he is constantly striving." 54 And in this
resolution is realized the earlier, promised overcoming of
paralyzing'objective' skepticism -not through some Cartesian
foundationalist certitude, butby the existential' coming into' of
the human hermeneutical circle the right way.
I
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